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Potential Impacts on Individuals Caused by the
Invasion of NGOs into International Politics
Zhao Li, Haibin Qi
ABSTRACT: In the contemporary world, NGOs are playing significant roles in international cooperation and globalization. This actively promotes the formation of a global society. Accompanying that,
NGOs also have an increased international political influence.
Against this background, some scholars believe the rise of NGOs will
create an era of individuals’ emancipation from the sovereign states,
while others consider that the golden age of autonomy has passed.
This paper studies the essence of the association dominated by NGOs
and how this association affects individuals in international politics.
This paper suggests that the ideal subject for NGOs is one with clearly defined and precise goals and is isolated or compatible with other
subjects lest drawing governments’ hostility. The idealized NGOs
predominating over all fields may create enterprise association and
also help to contribute to a closed international society. The voice of
individuals will be silenced in enterprise association and closed society. Therefore, NGOs should function objectively as subsidiary
subjects of civil association. If NGOs intrude into the international
political field, they will harm individuals.
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The Rise of International Organizations in the Contemporary
World
International organizations have proliferated rapidly during the
last century. According to the database, Yearbook of International
Organizations, in 1909 there were only thirty-seven intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and 176 nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).1 These numbers grew to 4,565 for IGOs and 23,635 for
NGOs by 1991.2 By the year 2013, there were already 7,756 IGOs
and 59,383 NGOs globally.3 Approximately 1,200 new organizations
are added each year.4
Robert Jordan, who was a distinguished professor of strategy and
policy at the U.S. Naval War College and once served as director of
research for the U.N. Institute for Training and Research, concluded
that “concomitant with their growth, IGOs and INGOs have become
increasingly significant actors in world politics”.5 Though it is too
far to claim that the state is no longer the primary component in contemporary international politics, we cannot ignore the “alternative
and possibly competitive foci of power and influence”6 caused by international organizations. Hiner Hanggi, Ralf Roloff, and Jurgen
Ruland distinguished the five levels of international policy-making:
global, inter/trans-regional, macro-regional, trans-border institutions
at a sub-regional level, and bilateral state to state.7 International organizations have played critical roles in the first four levels.8 It is
safe for us to conclude that the international political system now
consists of three levels of subjects: nation-states through making bilateral treaties,9 IGOs, and NGOs.10

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORG. 2013-2014, Vol. 4, fig. 2.9
(2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
ROBERT JORDAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
TO THE MANAGEMENT OF COOPERATION 20 (4th ed. 2001).
Id. at 39.
HINER HAG
̈ GI ET AL., INTERREGIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Jürgen
Rüland ed., Routledge 2006).
Id.
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Though having much in common, IGOs and NGOs present diverse trends of development. From 1981 to 1991, the number of
IGOs had increased over threefold, while NGOs increased nearly
80%. Despite the tremendous growth of both, IGOs still had a much
higher growth rate in the1980s.11 The 1990s saw a slowdown of
IGOs, the growth rate of which fell to only 48%.12 While in the year
2001, the number of NGOs amounted to nearly double compared to
that of 1991, meaning the growth rate of NGOs keeps increasing and
surpassing that of IGOs.13 Though the growth in the international organization has leveled off from 2001 to 2014, the rate of NGOs
(26%) is still higher than IGOs (15%).14 Comparing the bilateral and
multilateral treaties that played the most significant role in international politics after the Second World War, IGOs and NGOs were
most active in the 1980s. More specifically, the period after the Cold
War witnessed the prosperity of NGOs. We can easily revise Macdougal’s assertion back in 1966 that the Nineteenth Century is characterized as the era of the nation-state and the Twentieth Century is
considered the era of the intergovernmental organization, while posterity may characterize our period as one of NGOs.15
According to this trend, there are increasingly more people who
believe that, with the assistance of NGOs, “the individual appears to
occupy the central stage of international law.”16 “Never before, in the
history of human kind, have people possessed so many rights and
freedoms opposable to sovereign states.”17 Therefore, one could conclude that the contemporary world is experiencing “the renascent of
the individual.”18
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

The number of multilateral treaties, though, was only 10 percent of that of bilateral
treaties, following the increasing trend. However, it’s always hard to distinguish the
simple multilateral treaties and international organizations. THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N,
supra note 1.
THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
EDUARDO SZAZI, NGOS: LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 (Leiden
Univ. Press 2012).
Id.
Id.
M.McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in
R.FALK, THE FUTURE OF INT’L LEGAL ORDER 94 (PUP Princeton 1969).
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Compared to sovereign states, NGOs have brought about a different kind of association that leads to the arising of new ways of
governance in international politics—governance without a state,
which marks the fading of modern statehood.19 Considering that “the
tension between states’ rights and individual rights has become particularly difficult to solve in recent times,”20 the decline of modern
statehood may lead the emancipation of individuals.21 In other
words, the golden age of democracy may be coming to an end. There
are still some people that have an opposite position. For example,
Richard Tuck, a professor at Harvard University, claims the golden
age, which existed in the Seventeenth Century, has passed for good,
which, though seemingly strange and ill-timed, perhaps still makes
sense.22
This paper will first briefly review the themes, discussions, and
theories in international politics back to the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Century in order to present a historical prospect of international cooperation on the basic of this particular subject. Tracing this
back will reveal how the areas and discussions are different between
international politics based on states system in the past and NGOs in
the contemporary world. The distinct areas and discussions leading
to different cooperation of individuals will be explained later.
Through the analysis of the field and subject of NGOs, this paper
takes a process of ascending from empirical data to concepts. The ascension here has two purposes. First, it means to convert the analysis
of empirical data to that of an ideal type. Second, it will analyze, the
concrete established institution of NGOs to the pattern of governance
they bring up. We assert that an NGO is a special medium of governance technique, which is still latent in contemporary international
politics，and is already prepared to conquer this field actively. Finally, we will see how this kind of governing is perverse to a healthy
civil society open to individuals.
Before we dive into analysis, there are still several preliminary
comments that need to be clarified. This paper seeks to unfold the
19.
20.
21.
22.

THOMAS. RISSE, GOVERNANCE WITHOUT A STATE?: POLICIES AND POL. IN AREAS OF
LIMITED STATEHOOD 276 (Columbia Univ. 2011).
DOMINIK ZAUM, LEGITIMATING INT’L ORG. 40 (Oxford Scholarship Online Jan. 2013,
2014).
Id.
Id.
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prospect of international politics influenced by NGOs from the perspective of political philosophy. Some concrete NGOs are not the objects of this paper. This paper has an emphasis on international
NGOs and politics but it also refers to domestic NGOs and politics.
However, the conclusion can be applied to them as well. If so, why
does this paper deliberately focus on international NGOs? When
analyzing justice of a man, Socrates, in Plato’s work The Republic,
turned to discuss with his friends about justice in the city-state.23 Because there would be more justice in the larger and it would be easier
to observe closely.24 Socrates takes it as considering the issues of the
larger as a way to address the issues of the smaller.25 Similarly, the
situation of INGOs to international politics is very similar to the situation of NGOs in domestic politics. Also in the international area,
states are “larger” than the “smaller” individuals; therefore, stating a
comparison of the individual to the state is a better reference when
discussing NGOs. Besides, there is a moderate analysis of IGOs, but
IGOs are not the issue of this paper. IGOs are introduced into this
study as a transitional type between the state and NGO.26 By making
a comparative analysis between IGOs and NGOs, the nature of NGOs
becomes clearer. When the instrumental functions of IGOs are fully
examined then the discussion on it will gradually disappear from the
paper.
International Politics Before the Twentieth Century.
Richard Tuck concluded with slight pessimism at the end of his
book, The Right of War and Peace, stating that “it is important that
we are clear about what autonomy meant in the days when it became
the central virtue, so that we can also be clear about what we may be
losing in our own time.”27 Tuck attempted to guide his readers back
to the Seventeenth Century after the Peace Treaty of Westphalia was

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 147 (T. E. Page et al. eds., Paul Shorey trans., Harvard Univ.
Press rev. ed. 1937) (c. 380 B.C.E.).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 147-49.
THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, supra note 1.
RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHT OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 234 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
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signed in 1648.28 In the Westphalian system, the state is regarded as
an organization that has the highest level of power or is the sovereign
in its territory.29 This basic principle of autonomy helps form an independent political community.30 Due to economic interference,
though extremely limited, and international norms, though weak, the
ideal autonomy never existed during the Westphalian period. However, as the states only “accepted very few international obligations
in either conventional or customary law”, the states, as Mark Zacher
mentioned, “maintained a high degree of policy autonomy by not
enmeshing themselves in a large number of international regimes and
especially not in a regime that restricted their ability to use military
force.”31
Natural right theorists conceive that sovereign states are subjects
which behave like individuals. Tuck pointed out that this kind of
metaphor for the international arena is a near-perfect example of the
operation of the fundamental principles of the natural right theorists.32
Among them, Thomas Hobbes presented the most profound explanation. Hobbes, whose experience was colored by the British civil war
in the 1640s, followed by his successors,33 proposed the concept of
the state of nature, meant individuals lived close by without any kind
of state sovereignty existing to explain the pre-civil world of humans.34 State of nature, though presumed to explain the relationship
between individual men, acts as a metaphor to state of international
relationship, and as Rousseau announced, “the Hobbesian ‘man’ was
really a state all along, displaying characteristics that were usually
encountered only in state, such as a constant and unforgiving striving
for power.”35

28.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 59
(James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czemprel eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) [hereinafter GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT].
Id.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Tuck, supra note 27, at 9.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 230.
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This concept, according to Charles Beitz, is assumed to be constructed by individuals without social connection.36 Similarly, international relations, to a certain extent, are an autonomous agent without any effective relationships.37 The autonomy of the state in the
Seventeenth Century lacked the sense of global civil society; therefore, the sovereign state in the Seventeenth Century is the best paradigm for individuals lacking necessary social connection.38 In the
state of nature, there is no public agreement about good and evil,
which implies a lack of justice in law.39 The concept of states’ autonomy was not understood as taking action following desires and interests of states, but rather by policies and strategies in international
affairs as they saw fit in a political environment that was similar to
Israel in the period of Judges.40 Finally, because of competition, diffidence, and glory, there is war of everyone against everyone41 in the
state of nature. Of course, this ideal concept, due to its highly abstract style, failed to meet every situation and experience, but it is still
applicable to explaining the international arena. Hobbes asserts that
though this typical state of nature never existed in history, stating,
“yet in all times, kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of
their Independency, are in continually . . . a posture of war.”42
For Hobbes, the war in state of nature is hard to bear — just
think about this famous depiction in Leviathan:
[T]here is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is
uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be import36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.

CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 42 (Princeton
Univ. Press 1999).
Id. at 8.
Though it does not means that Hobbes ignores any social cooperation as Charles Beitz
has claimed. Noel Malcolm has clarified, “The general picture that emerges here is of
cooperation and interaction between states, and between the subjects of states, taking
place at many levels . Hobbes’s account contains many of the ingredients of what
modern theorists describe as an international society . .” NOEL MALCOLM, ASPECT OF
HOBBES 452 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
PATRICK DEVLIN, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS,
181 (Oxford Univ. Press 1965).
Nir Kedar, Democracy and Judicial Autonomy in Israel’s Early Years, 15 ISRAEL
STUDIES 25-46 (2010).
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88 (Richard Ruck ed., 1651).
Id. at 90.
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ed by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of
moving, and removing such things as require much force; no
Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no
Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.43
Human beings would end either in self-destruction or escape to another sovereign state.44 Since neither of these happened in the Seventeenth Century, Hobbes succeeded in setting up the presumption at
the beginning, and failed at the end.45 Why does this happen? Professor Tuck quoted the opinion of Max Weber, who saw that overseas
expansions was the certain unique and never repeating precondition
of freedom and democracy,46 to imply the answer. Though vaguely
asserted, Tuck’s answer could reasonably be speculated to imply, that
the sustainability of supplies from new continents by overseas expansions make the state of nature not extremely insupportable in a system of international politics based on autonomy of state.47
In the Nineteenth Century, along with the fading of providing
new continents and the resources, the western world gradually organized a balanced system ruled by limited international law.48 The
system of autonomy came under threat in Europe by Napoleon’s war
of conquest and broke down into unbridled anarchy in the first few
years in the Eighteenth Century.49 The arena of international politics
is closer to the state of nature described by Hobbes. It was far from
bearable, so that a new system might be worked out to evolve.50 Un43.
44.
45.

Id. at 89.
Id. at 89-90.
Todd Calder, Hobbes’ Moral and Political Philosophy, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHIL. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/.
46. TUCK, supra note 27, at 15.
47. Id.
48. Congress of Vienna: the Forerunner of Multilateral Diplomacy, THE EXAMINER (Aug.
7, 2010).
http://www.examiner.com/article/congress-of-vienna-the-forerunner-of-multilateraldiplomacy [hereinafter Congress of Vienna].
49. Id.
50. Christoph Neusiedl, The Concept of Human Nature in International Relations-A Case
Study of Realism and Liberalism, ACADEMIA.EDU 2-3 (2015),
http://www.academia.edu/The_concept_of_human_nature_in_International_Relations
_a_case_study_of_realism_and_liberalism.
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like practicing the solution proposed by Hobbes, in which individuals
are persuaded to institute a sovereignty, world politics in the Nineteenth Century were marked by the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815
and the Hague Peace Conference in 1899, and have gradually
evolved into a system constructed by laws of war, arbitration, and
multilateral treaty.51
Stephen Neff, a professor at University of Edinburgh, concluded
that the Nineteenth Century was “an age of great achievement in international law as in so many other walks of life.”52 The premise of
the state of nature must be modified to fit because of the concern with
the changes and development in international politics during that
era.53 The appropriate theory was nothing new in the Nineteenth
Century, as it had already been proposed by Samuel Pufendorf during
the same period as Hobbes.54
Despite some acknowledged basic principles, there is profound
distinction between Pufendorf and Hobbes’ explanations of the state
of nature. The dividing consensus begs the question: could the state
of nature be imagined as a human society? Contradictory to Hobbes,
who argued the commonwealths “should still continue in a State of
mutual war” by lacking any emotional and ethical connection, Pufendorf believed that the common sense of mankind was that “those
Commonwealths, how distinct so ever” could be “allied by Friendship and by Leagues.”55 Pufendorf’s theory on international affairs,
especially the case in Germany “to reconstruct a decent and pacific
life in Germany on the basis of precisely such alliances and leagues
between states,”56 could invalidate Hobbesian Theory.57 In this kind
of explanation, the state of nature “is so constituted that the race cannot be preserved without social life.”58 Compared to the weak affiliation of friendship, common interest plays a foundational role in building up a global society.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Congress of Vienna, supra note 48.
STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 218
(Harvard Univ. Press 2014).
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 150 (London 1729).
Id.
Id.
TUCK, supra note 27, at 150.
Id.
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN 36 (1682).
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Since 1815, many has been suggested the idea of “a global
community interest.”59 In prophet-like tones, Pufendorf debated with
Hobbes to defend a collective interest, “[a]lthough our moral language thus reflects our interests, it does not directly reflect our personal interests, as Hobbes had thought; instead, if used properly, it
always refers to whatever will in some way advance a collective interest, or aid in the construction of patterns of social life.”60 A
framework of international law, which helps to regulate and form the
collective interest, could find its counterpart in the Pufendorf’s theory
of natural law. This framework does not work in the state of nature in
Hobbes’ explanation. Though lacking the coercive power of the state
to ensure the implementation, the law can still be “investigated by the
light of reason61“.
Professor Tuck criticized the theory of Pufendorf stating that it
“had lost the sense of autonomous agents constructing their ethical
environment.”62 The same anxiety could be inspired in global politics
in the Nineteenth Century that the autonomy of the state might be totally immersed by the new system.63 Comparing that situation to contemporary global politics, Professor Tuck’s criticism is only partially
correct. The operation of reason in theories of international law in
the Nineteenth Century was restricted by a limited target: for peace
among states in theory, to prevent any hegemony on the continent,
and to avoid a pan-European war.64 If peace is the main goal, reason
in international politics of the Nineteenth Century is nothing less than
ability for rational discourse. Diverse states are considered to be the
foundation and the logical assumption of rational discourse in international politics, the system of international politics in the Nineteenth
Century was also constituted by sovereign states.65
This new system, established by the peacemakers from 1814181566 and sharing characteristics similar to hierarchy and anarchy,

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 28, at 56.
TUCK, supra note 27, at 149.
PUFENDORF, supra note 58, at 37.
TUCK, supra note 27, at 230.
Id.
GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 28, at 38.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 38.
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developed, changed, oscillated,67 decayed, and ultimately collapsed at
the breakout of World War I.68 This still leaves a lot of legacy for
contemporary international law.
A Comparative Analysis to State, IGO and NGO by Type.
The Nineteenth Century is still viewed as the era of the nationstate, even though there was an increase in international law.69 In the
Twentieth Century, the advancement of the international political
system of nation-states was confined by a persistent increase in the
number of international treaties. There were 6,351 bilateral treaties
entered into force between 1945 and 1955.70 After two decades the
number doubled again, amounting to 14,061 between 1966 and
1975.71
Despite of the decay of the Westphalian system, the state is still
“the primary political unit in the composition of the contemporary international system.”72 The system of nation-states, though saturated
with a great variety of formal and informal international rules, is by
no means removing its nucleus of autonomy or sovereignty. Realism
theoretical paradigm, which presumed that the primary motive of the
warring states in international affairs was to constantly compete for
territorial, material, and human resources，always reiterated by
scholars on the insight of this nucleus.73 When international affairs
get involved in intense state interests, the model of the state of nature
proposed by Hobbes never fails in explaining the events.74 As James
Yunker suggested, “modern history also seems to suggest that the

67.
68.
69.

Id. at 32.
NEFF, supra note 52, at 219.
To the point of Reinhard (2007), “Even in Europe, the birthplace of modern statehood,
nation-state were only able to fully establish the monopoly over the use of force in
Nineteenth Century.” RISSE, supra note 19, at 6
70. GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, surpa note 28, at 66.
71. Id. (Database comes from PETER ROHN, ROHN’S WORLD TREATY INDEX: VOLUME I
(1997), and MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS (Bowman & Harris eds., London: Butterworths 1984)).
72. GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, surpa note 28, at 100.
73. César de Prado, Global Multi-Level Governance: European and East Asian Leadership, United Nations Univ. Press 219 (2007),
http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/samplechapters/multilevel.
Governance_dePrado_UNUPress_chapter.pdf.
74. TUCK, supra note 27.
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sovereign nation-state system possess a strong propensity toward the
generation of hostility, conflict and warfare among nations.75
Though states could draft bilateral treaties to regular their behaviors, it still could not be a persuasive reason to reject Hobbes’s theory, for Hobbes himself never denied the possibilities of the cooperation of states.76 He even believed that there could be high levels of
cooperation in international politics.77 Hobbes’s attitude on international trade and cooperation is the best example. “[I]nternational
trade, in Hobbes’s view, was essential for the well-being of a commonwealth … He recognized that trade required a system of commercial law … The general picture that emerges here is of cooperation and interaction between states.”78 Without a coercive force to
enforce the obligations, the goals of treaties could only be reached by
chance.79 The goals always fail in vain by their weakness.80 In the
background of globalization, this system of the states is believed to
be an obstacle to permanent and stable cooperation in international
society. As D. Grewal argued, “[e]verything is being globalized except politics.”81
Compared to the chaos brought about by the states, IGOs indicate the real systems that take supranational organizations as their
center. These organizations have the capacity to interfere and regulate
the states’ actions in some specific aspects.82 In an idealistic IGO,
states have the right to participate in policy-making, and their involvement within the IGO is limited.83 The essential boundary of
each state remains intact in this structure. In other words, states are
integrated organically without being deprived of their nature.

75.

James A. Yunker, Beyond Global Governance: Prospects for Global Government,
INT’L J. ON WORLD PEACE, Vol. XXVI No.2, June 2009.
76. THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZENS 29 (Raymond Geuss & Quentin Skinner eds.,
1998).
77. TUCK, supra note 27.
78. NOEL MALCOLM, ASPECT OF HOBBES 452 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
79. ON THE CITIZENS, supra note 76.
80. LEVIATHAN, supra note 41.
81. DAVID GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 50
(Yale University Press 2008).
82. International Government Organizations (IGOs), HARV. L. SCH. (2015),
http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-is-public-interest-law/public-internationallaw/intergovernmental-organizations-igos/.
83. Id.
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The Yearbook of International Organizations has distinguished
fifteen different types of international organizations applying to both
IGOs and NGOs:
A. federations of international organizations; B. universal
membership organizations; C. intercontinental membership
organizations; D. regionally oriented membership organizations; E. organizations emanating from places, persons, and
bodies; F. organizations of special form, G. internationally
oriented national organizations; H. dissolved or apparently
inactive organizations; J. recently reported bodies – not yet
confirmed; K. subsidiary and internal bodies; N. national
organizations; R. religious orders and secular institutes; S.
autonomous conference series; T. multilateral treaties and
intergovernmental agreements; and U. currently inactive
nonconventional bodies.84
Unsurprisingly, in the Twentieth Century, T type IGOs, 2,172
out of 3,865,85 are the largest classification of currently active IGOs.86
This phenomenon had not changed by 2013, during which time 2,406
T type IGOs existed out87 of 5,002 IGOs.88 In all the types of IGOs,
multilateral treaties and intergovernmental agreements, which can
never exist as a real type of NGOs, are most closely related to bilateral treaties, which could only be regarded as the typical international
cooperation among sovereign states.89 In this sense, although the multilateral treaties and intergovernmental agreements cannot be identified with the bilateral treaties, the structure of IGOs did not move too
far from the system of the sovereign state.

84.

85.

86.
87.
88.
89.

THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, Types of International Organization, UNION OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, http://www.uia.org/archive/types-organization/toy
(last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
The number “3865” comes from total number of IGOs in 20th Century (5725) by deducing the number of type H (639) and U (1221). THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, supra
note 1, fig. 2.9.
Id.
The number “5002” comes from total number of IGOs by the year 2013 (7756) by deducing the number of type H (801) and U (1953) Id.
Id.
Thomas Miles & Erica Posner, Which States Enter Into Treaties and Why?, UNIV. OF
CHI. L. SCH. (2008), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/420.pdf.
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Due to the new global crisis and problems, new types of actors
are nurtured to give response to them.90 Global environmental issues
have “provided new opportunities for civil society actors to address
problems which the geographically delimited states may be inadequate to address.”91 As Thomas Davies concluded “the inability of
states effectively to deal with transnational environment problems
may have led to the development of an alternative world civic politics
to deal with these issues that may bypass state institutions altogether.”92 Similarly to environment, other areas are on the attack of globalization.93 As a result, there is a strong need for new kind of actors
in international human society to overcome the boundaries of the
states. If as generally suggested, international organizations have
presented the trend of gradually growing of “the broadening power
and influence of international actors extending beyond the sovereign
state system,”94 then NGO is the culmination in bypassing states’
boundaries.95
According to the Yearbook, NGOs in type G (internationally oriented national organizations) account for 98.14% of all international
organizations in this type, the ratio of which is at the peak among all
types.96 However, two types are excluded, national organizations and
religious orders and secular institutes, which account for 99.94% and
100% respectively. These two types contradict the nature and definition of IGOs, which makes the comparative study invalid and is much
higher than the average.97 All international organizations in Type G
have an international origination.98 If an organization can ignore the
national elements in its origination, it is more independent from
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

96.
97.
98.

Michael Edwards, David Hulme, & Tina Wallace, NGOs In a Global Future: Marrying Local Delivery to Worldwide Leverage, GLOBAL DEV. RES. CENTER,
http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/g-future.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2016).
THOMAS DAVIES, NGOS: A NEW HISTORY OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIETY 177 (2014).
Id.
Edwards, Hulme, & Wallace, supra note 90.
ROBERT JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE
MANAGEMENT OF COOPERATION 20 (4th ed. 2001).
Samuel Worthington, The Role of U.S. NGOs in Global Development and Humanitarian Work, INTERACTION,
http://www.interaction.org/files/FABB%202013_Sec01_PolicyPaper_RoleOfNGOs.p
df (last visited Jan. 9, 2016).
THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
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states.99 Therefore, compared with IGOs, NGOs are more independent and have a greater tendency in bypassing states’ boundaries,
which meets the inference from the nature of NGOs.
A Comparative Analysis of Distribution of NGOs, IGOs and
States by Subjects.
Within its territory, a state can acquire its legitimate sovereign
power. Through this power, people are organized and obliged to
obey the rules legitimated by the government and keep their fidelity
towards sovereignty.100 However, NGOs, especially international
NGOs, are not confined by the boundaries of the states and cannot be
categorized as domestic agencies.101 The association created by
NGOs is thoroughly different from civil association supported by
states. Due to the special structure， NGO is not compatible with
any kind of association. The NGO has a particular pattern of association. In fact, NGOs can be viewed as mediums of a specific association. The next problem is how can we reveal the characteristics of
this association?
A. Where Our Analysis will Begin.
The first thing we need to understand is that the pattern of this
association is very fragile and easily distorted and even covered by
impacts of other kinds of association or force.102 However, there are
some clues left through which the characteristics of the association
can be brought to light. The most obvious clue is the areas that are
easy for NGOs to thrive in or subjects they are prone to operate on
mostly.103 If relatively large amounts of NGOs gather in some specific areas, the technique of governance on these subjects may best fit

99. Id.
100. Authority and Legitimacy, ROUTLEDGE TAYLOR & FRANCIS GROUP,
http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/alevelphilosophy/data/AS/WhyShouldIBeGoverned
/Authorityandlegitimacy.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2016).
101. Peter Willetts, What is a Non-Governmental Organization?, CITY UNIV., LONDON
(http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/peter-willets.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2016).
102. DOROTHEA BAUR, NGOS AS LEGITIMATE PARTNERS OF CORPORATIONS: A POLITICAL
CONCEPTUALIZATION 127 (2011).
103. Id.
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the nature of NGOs.104 The pattern of association is revealed through
analyzing the technique of governance on these subjects.
There are two elements that contribute to forming the association: the subject people deal with and how the people deal with it.105
For example, Cicero, the great politician in ancient Rome, defined a
republic as “a numerous gathering brought together by legal consent
and community of interest.”106 Therefore, the main subject that the
people pursue in a republic is common interest. People are defined as
“being not every assemblage or mob.” Saint Augustine, Bishop of
Hippo, concluded that the wealth of the people “exists only when it is
well and justly governed.”107 In this case, justice is the way the people must work with their subject in a republic.108
While justice and governance are independent of each other, they
always correspond.109 For example, if a group of people wants to operate an enterprise, they need to work efficiently. While they strive
for their common interests as a republic, they must do it justly.110
Even though how people govern has a closer relationship with the
pattern of the association, the subjects they deal with are more easily
discerned by empirical studies. Then it is more reasonable for us to
examine the subject of NGOs. From the Seventeenth Century to the
Nineteenth Century, war and peace remain the main subjects in international politics.111 As a result, despite the diverse structure between
the Westphalian system and the states system regulated by international law, the participants in international politics always legalize
their actions through the claims of justice.112 However, the modern
issues are distributed much more widely than before. This paper first

104. DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN CRISES THROUGH
NGOS 18, 21 (2009).
105. Peace Corps, The Role of NGOs in a Civil Society,
http://files.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/library/M0070_mod1.pdf (last visited Jan.
9, 2016).
106. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE REPUBLIC 19 (Niall Rudd trans., 1998).
107. SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 76 (1887).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. COLIN S. GRAY, WAR, PEACE AND INT’L RELATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC
HISTORY 1 (2007).
112. Hedley Bull, Order vs. Justice In Int’l Society, 19 POL. STUD. 269-83 (1971),
http://press.anu.edu.au/sdsc/hedley/mobile_devices/ch08.html.
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analyzes the distribution of NGOs by subjects and makes a comparative analysis to IGOs, in order to reveal the pattern of the association
brought up by NGOs.
B. Distribution of International Organization by Subjects.
According to “The Number of International Organizations by
Subject of Activity” of the Yearbook of International Organizations,
the amount of NGOs are distributed homogeneously by the subjects
of their activities.113 One may claim that it is because of the different
saturation points of international activities by international organizations in diverse areas.114 The distribution of the number of IGOs is
not the same with that of NGOs, where IGOs are also categorized as
international organizations and implement international activities in
all areas where NGOs are involved.115 The diverse state of distribution by subjects between NGOs and IGOs is probably caused by their
different natures. Considering this, the analysis takes IGOs as a medium, and only uses the data of the amounts of activities of IGOs by
subjects as reference to analyze that of NGOs.116 The figure below
was produced based on data and categories collected by the Yearbook:

113. THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, NUMBER OF INT’L ORG. BY SUBJECT OF ACTIVITY, 51
YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS. 175, Fig. 5.3 (2014) [hereinafter YEARBOOK OF INT’L
ORGS].
114. Id.
115. In this paper, the terms “subject” and “area” are synonymous. However, it does not
mean there is no difference between the two. The term “area” places particular emphasis on the nature of matter. It concerns objects. While the notion of “subject” has
direct relationship with active actors—people. It emphasizes people in specific situations participating in the formation of a subject in a particular area. Generally speaking, “subject” and “area” are two different aspects of the same thing. See YEARBOOK
OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113.
116. YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113.
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No. Subjects Above 4.5) ON TA

N/I

No. Subjects
ON TA
(Below 4.5)

N/I

1

Religious Practice

36

1951

282.43 16

Management

42

1894

4.27

2

Health Care

32

4601

12.45

17

Cooperation

82

1755

2.77

3

Education

33

5675

10.90

18

Finance

27

5061

2.08

4

Employment

22

8634

7.80

19

Transportation Tech

25

3604

1.90

5

Society (Element)

21

6255

7.17

20

Law

39

3534

1.88

6

Production

28

4225

6.83

21

Defence
(Police)*

35

877

1.30

7

Culture

54

1745

6.83

22

Government
(Politics)

37

2597

1.12

8

Science

51

1582

6.72

23

Environment

49

3780

0.41

9

Research Standard

31

7208

6.61

10

Conservation

69

2236

5.82

11

Amenities (Necessities) 24

1894

5.76

12

Technology

48

1921

5.24

13

International Relations

59

1637

5.09

14

Development

60

4792

4.85

15

Information

23

2403

4.55

The original data and categories come from the Yearbook of International Organizations, the statistics were collected in 2013.117
The fifth and tenth rows show the amount of NGOs’ activities divided by that of IGOs’ according to various subjects (N/I).118 All data in
this figure is arrayed from high to low according to this index.119 Finally, the fourth and ninth rows are the total amounts of all international organizations’ actions. The third and eighth rows indicate the
original numbers in the Yearbook.120
Concerning all subjects of actions, the grand total of NGOs is 4.5
times greater than that of IGOs.121 All data of N/I from left line is
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113, figs.5.1, 5.3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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higher than the average (High), while that of right line is below the
average (Low). In order to reduce contingency, the total amounts
under 1,000 are not taken into consideration (except for defense, for
it is traditional subjects in international politics).122 Amounts above
3,000 can be categorized as high and those between 1,000 and 3,000
as low. The figure below concludes this section:
Clearly, NGOs frequently get involved in subjects like medicine,
health care, and education, for both the index of N/I and the total
Total Amount
(High Above 3000)

Total Amount
(Low 1000-3000)

NGOs / IGOs
(High Above Avg.)

Medicine/
Health Care/
Education

Classification/
Futurology

NGOs / IGOs
(Low Below Avg.)

Environment/Finance

Defence/Government

amount of organizations are high.123 In contrast, they are least active
in areas like defense and government, which are low in both N/I and
the total. For some subjects of this category, the number of IGOs is
very close to or even higher than that of NGOs. For example, there
are 1,227 IGOs working on the subject of Government, which is approaching the number NGOs, estimated to be 1,370.124 Comparatively, IGOs fit better in areas like Environment and Finance. While
there are large amounts of IGOs active on these subjects, the NGOs
seldom work on them. The subjects with high N/I statistics and low
totals are difficult to analyze. This is because the comparative advantage that NGOs have over IGOs on these subjects is highly interfered with by the naturally low saturation of international organizations.

122. Id.
123. YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113.
124. Id.
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C. The First Explanation—State Interests.
What factor causes this diverse distribution of international organizations by subjects? One reasonable explanation is state interests. Thomas Davies, a professor at City University London, discovered this factor when analyzing the ascent and decline of the
NGOs.125 He had traced back the three waves of “transnational civil
society:” the mid-Nineteenth Century to the outset of the Twentieth
Century, the end of World War I to the 1920s, and the second half of
the Twentieth Century to the outset of the new millennium.126 Each
wave had witnessed a period of great expansion in varieties and
numbers of NGOs with their proponents claiming to speak for “the
most representative forces of the different countries” in the period before World War I, the “public opinion of the world” in the period
preceding World War II or “global civil society” in the period preceding the September 11, 2001 attacks,127 but finally ended with the
demise of transnational civil society.128 Davies analyzed some factors
that affect the demise, including “Scientific/Technological, Environmental, Economic, Social, External Politics, and Internal Politics.”129
All of these factors are believed to be double-edged swords, which
could both facilitate and deter the development of NGOs.130 The
trend of detriment is always brought by factions and illiberal actors,
and is always accompanied by exhaustion.
What contributes to fragmentation of the international civil society, promoted by NGOs? Divisive trends always originate from areas
and issues involving high state interests, such as disarmament in the
1930s and substitution for the welfare roles of fragile states in the
post-Cold War era.131 If these areas and issues are preoccupied by
nationalism, as in the late Nineteenth Century, NGOs could stop acting on behalf of world public opinion. According to Davies, it is nationalism – not the inner problem of the NGO – that operates only on
behalf of the sovereign state, narrows its prospect of interest within
the national boundaries, and devastates the prospect of the reviving of
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

DAVIES, supra note 91, at 180.
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id. at 9.
DAVIES, supra note 91, 12-13.
Id. at 175.
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individuals.132 He complains “the leadership of INGOs and transnational coalitions of INGOs should avoid claims to speak on behalf of
the public opinion of the world or global civil society, when such organizations have only ever represented a segment of the world’s population.”133
Davies’s theory can also explain the case of diverse distribution
of NGO by subject. It is easy to infer from Davies’s point of view
that NGOs could be expected to thrive on subjects, or in fields, involved with low state interest. Some NGOs widely distribute on subjects like medicine, healthcare, and education, and are considered as
fields involved with lower state interests. Economic areas are involved with higher state interest. There are relatively fewer NGOs,
but IGOs are more vigorous in the fields mentioned above.134 Government, defense, and military are identified with fields within intense state interest, in which NGOs struggle to survive, while IGOs
adapt better.135
Further analysis supports this suggestion. In fields of structure
and context social action which government and defense belong to,
the number of type G NGOs (Internationally oriented national organizations) and N (National organizations), which are influenced by the
strong boundaries of the states, are more than that of Type E,136 in
which the structure of the sovereign state tends to be ignored.137
While in cosmosphere/geosphere and biosphere which contain medicine and bio-science, the situation is completely the opposite.138 We
can safely conclude that when approaching the pole of medicine and
biosphere with or without low involving state interests, the influence
by boundaries of the states to NGOs gradually weaken.139 While getting close to the opposite—fields involved with the most intensive

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id, at 181-82.
Id, at 91-92.
Id, at 11-12.
YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113, fig. 5.6, at 175. Type E refers to organizations emanating from places, persons, bodies.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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state interests—the structure of states tend to acquire an increasing
impact on international cooperation.140
Though having type difference with NGOs, the distribution tendency of IGOs is similar. In fields involving the most intensive state
interests, multilateral treaties and intergovernmental agreements constitute the majority of IGOs.141 For example, IGOs of Type T account
for 7,133 out of 13,980 of the total in fields of structure and context
social action.142 Compared to other types, Type T is closer to bilateral treaties reached by states.143 So in areas involved with high state
interests, where it is hard for NGOs to survive, the structure of IGOs
is most similar to the system of sovereignty of states.
We could discover a spectrum of fields ranging from intense
state interest to low state interest.144 This spectrum expands from areas of defense, military, government, and other vital interests concerning the sovereign of the state at one pole, to fields like finance
and environment in the middle, then to the areas with low or without
state interest, such as medicine, health care and education at the opposite.145 The first level fields close to the pole involving intense
state interest could be hard for international organizations to survive.
They mainly are the stages of the sovereign states. The finance and
environment in the middle level are environmentally friendly to
IGOs.146 NGOs act most vigorously in the third level.147
If we make a narrow standard to classify the degree of international cooperation by its efficiency, the system of the sovereign states
without doubt has the lowest success ratio and efficiency for cooperation. When the nucleus of autonomy is still possessed by the states,
the system of the states always exists as a Hobbesian state of nature.
If we see the boundaries of the states as the obstacle for international
cooperation, the external environment for idealistic NGOs will avoid
the boundaries of the states and dwell in the third level where NGOs
could act uniformly without segmenting themselves and acquire the
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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highest degree of cooperation. The spectrum discussed here is shown
in the following figure:

State Interest
Fields/
Subjects
Typical
Subjects
Degree of
Cooperation

High
Defense/Military
/Government
States

Medium
Environment/
Finance
IGOs

Low
Medicine/
Health Care
NGOs

Low

Medium

High

While at the one pole, the chaos sphere of Hobbesian state of nature hangs over the international cooperation; the opposite presents a
clear profile of human society. Accompanied by the higher degree of
cooperation promoted by NGOs, the global human society, consisted
of institutions that “straddle the whole earth, and have complex effects that are felt in its four corners,”148 though may still be a “project” or an “aspiration” rather than an empirically observable phenomenon,149 is already on the agenda instead of only dwelling in the
human mind. The prospect of this kind of global human society
which is believed to be founded by NGOs through representing the
public claims150 seems to be much closer to the other prospect of the
state of nature proposed by Pufendorf, who considered the state of
nature as a human society created through common wealth. However, this analogy has finally proved to be a misunderstanding.151
In the background of globalization, common wealth—which is
redefined under the name of “public good” by economists—”stands
at the end of a chain stretching from local street cleaning to national
defense and environmental protection to global warming.”152 Pedro
148. JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY? 8 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
149. DAVIES, supra note 91, at 8.
150. DOROTHEA BAUR, NGOS AS LEGITIMATE PARTNERS OF CORPORATIONS: A POLITICAL
CONCEPTUALIZATION 5 (2011).
151. Id. at 6.
152. INGE KAUL, ET AL., PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION
xiv (Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
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Conceição listed several leading “Global Public Goods” including international financial stability, multilateral trade regime, global communications network and the internet, communicable disease control,
reducing the excessive disease burden, climate stability, and peace
and security.153 Among them, peace, which acts, as the sole common
wealth in Pufendorf’s theory, is just one category of these series of
“Global Public Good.”154 However, NGOs are active in providing the
rest of “Global Public Good,” which is especially true since the crisis
of world war was lightened after the cold war.155 These kinds of
common wealth were foreign to international areas in the Nineteenth
Century and also, of course, much harder for Pufendorf to prophesize
at his time.156
D. Amendment to the First Explanation—Complexity and
Abstractness.
It is important to make clear the relationship of the diverse subjects of common wealth discussed by Pufendorf on international society, and modern scholars on the “Global Public Good” or benefits
to globalization promoted by NGOS. In other words, what is the real
difference between peace/war and other subjects? Does the former
simply identify with an area involved with intense state interest? It is
clear that the positive answer fails to meet any situation.157 For example, health of individuals could be one of the most important for
public good. The area of medicine was supposed to get involved
with intense state interests and is not environmentally friendly for
NGOs.158 However, this is not the case according to the Yearbook of
International Organizations. It states that there were 4,765 NGOs operating in the fields of medicine by 2013, which is 26.5 times greater
than the number of IGOs in the same area. It is well above the aver-

153. Id., at 156.
154. Compare PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION xiv (Inge
Kaul et al. eds., 2003) with SAMUEL FREIHERR VON PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF
MAN: ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF NATURE BOOK II 255 (1698).
155. INGE KAUL, ET AL., supra note 152, at 202.
156. Id. at 206.
157. WORLD HEALTH ORG., MEASURING MEDICINE PRICES, AVAILABILITY, AFFORDABILITY
AND PRICE COMPONENTS xi (4th ed. 2008),
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/access/OMS_Medicine_prices.pdf.
158. Id. at 1-2.
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age ratio.159 This means that, though having great correlation with
commonwealth, the field of medicine is still extremely environmentally friendly to NGOs, which is a contradiction to our inference.160
This example weakens the assumption suggested above, which makes
it necessary to examine the premise underlining this assumption.
This assumption measures state interests merely according to
their quantity. If the state interests were reckoned only by quantitative aspects, then the degree of it can just be measured and leveled by
the possible devotion or deprivation for common wealth created by
the actions of international organizations.161 When analyzing individuals’ interest interpreted as pleasure, John Mill complained, “[i]t
would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is
considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be
supposed to depend on quantity alone.”162 Quantity alone is not sufficient to measure state interests, quality should be taken into account
as well. This means that the diverse areas and subjects NGOs operate
on can be distinguished from others by state interests of quantity as
well as quality.163
What is the meaning of “quality” here? Pertaining to subjects
themselves, quality can mean non-reductive and incommensurable
values of different public good in diverse areas.164 Based on this
premise, John Mill claimed that it might change the question of who
is the best judge to evaluate his own pleasure “in their opportunities

159. Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, UNION OF INT’L
ASS’N 180 (2014),
http://www.uia.org/sites/uia.org/files/misc_pdfs/stats/Number_of_international_organi
zations_by_subject_of_activity_2013.pdf.
160. Compare WORLD HEALTH ORG., MEASURING MEDICINE PRICES, AVAILABILITY,
AFFORDABILITY AND PRICE COMPONENTS xi (4th ed. 2008),
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/access/OMS_Medicine_prices.pdf, with Number
of International Organizations by Subject of Activity, UNION OF INT’L ASS’N 180
(2014),
http://www.uia.org/sites/uia.org/files/misc_pdfs/stats/Number_of_international_organi
zations_by_subject_of_activity_2013.pdf.
161. Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, supra note 159,
at 15.
162. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 11-12 (1863).
163. Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, supra note 161.
164. MILL, supra note 162, at 17.
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of experience,” instead of answering how to measure individuals’ interests or “pleasure” directly in his own term.165
Herbert Spencer once made an explanation of it, which could
apply to demonstrate the relationship of the sovereign state to its own
interests as well:
To have complete felicity is to have all the faculties exerted
in the ratio of their several developments . . . but the minds
of no two individuals contain the same combination of elements. Duplicate men are not to be found. There is in each
a different balance of desires. The conditions adapted for
the highest enjoyment of one, would not perfectly compass
the same end for any other. And consequently the notion of
happiness must vary with the disposition and character; that
is, must vary indefinitely.166
Likewise, in a complex situation, which means promoting interests in one area could lead to a deficit in the other area, only the sovereign state itself is best to measure its interests for there are no two
countries that are duplicate in their level of development and the
preference of their citizens.167 For example, environmental rights
could be exalted in a materially prosperous and highly developed
modern state.168 While in an impoverished town, citizens would need
to exhaust the resources of the forest nearby to compensate for shortage of the necessity.169 This is why the “West supported environmental NGOs gaining access to the Earth Summit” always confront the
hostility “from developing country governments, who were worried
that environment issues might become constrains upon development.”170 Then there is no general principle to measure best interests
of states. Other than “how to evaluate the state interests,” the real
165. Id.
166. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS; OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HAPPINESS
SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM DEVELOPED 15-16 (1873).
167. Id. at 319.
168. A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental Rule of Law Litigation (2000 Garrison
Lecture), 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 575, 597 (2002),
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/5.
169. Id. at 598.
170. PETER WILLETTS, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS 61
(2011).
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problem is “who is most capable to evaluate them.”171 Only the state
can measure which is best for its citizens through its sovereign.
In many fields of international politics, “benefiting regions may
not coincide with political boundaries.”172 Regional goals, according
to optimal disposition of world systems to achieve highest effectiveness are far from fitting the states’ best interests according its own
reckoning. In some areas, states tend to claim sovereignty on policy
and development project making according to their best benefit.173
So government always hinders actions of NGOs in these areas. We
can attribute subjects like social problems, economy, and even military and territory to these complex fields. However, when promoting
benefits in some areas can be compatible with others fields and also
easily absorbed into the states’ development plan, sovereign states
tend to stop acting as obstacles to NGOs.174 Contrary to complex
ones, these areas can be characterized by abstractness. As the complexity goes down towards abstractness, the subjects become more
available and environmentally friendly to NGOs.175
E. The Second Explanation—Clarity of Goals.
Robert Jordan has discovered that “most INGOs pursue particular interests, their foremost task is the attainment of specific goals for
promotion of their interests.”176 However, definite goals do not only
depend on the choices of INGOs. They also relate to the degree of
difficulty of forming clarity of goals in international perspective nurtured by specific fields. If the subject of a specific field cannot provide NGOs with clear goals by its nature, this field is not good soil
for NGOs.177 Referring to areas like defense and military in international politics, there is no real common goal among states except selfpreservation.178 Of course, states also could have shared values in
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

SPENCER, supra note 166, at 320.
INGE KAUL, ET AL., supra note 152, at xiv-xv.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 126.
ROBERT JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE
MANAGEMENT OF COOPERATION 34 (Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication
Data, 4th ed. 2001).
177. R.K. GUPTA, NGO’S AND GLOBAL POLICY (Mahaveer & Sons, 2009).
178. LEVIATHAN, supra note 41, at Ch. 13.
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these fields and cooperated as military alliances. But, it is not sufficient for them to “eliminate all other causes of war.”179 Because the
states “should rather, first, make a league against their enemies (rebellion) and afterwards, fight against one another.”180 Compared to
some weak bind by shared values, self-preservation is more essential
to the international relationship. Hobbes has clearly illustrated that
self-preservation, as a special common wealth. is by no means considered a fixed goal.181 In the state of nature, self-preservation could
expand and permeate into any kind of concrete goal. As a permanent
and stable relationship among its members, NGOs prefer the fields
that could provide goals precisely defined by their nature rather than
by chance.182
What’s more, defense and military lie in “a site of justice,”183
which is a stage full of moral language, good or evil, just and unjust.
Every state cannot fail in equipping itself with good and just to legislate its action. Then these subjects cast the actors back to the state of
nature. When analyzing the defects of the state of nature, John Locke
pointed out that “there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established
law.”184 Without this kind of judge, only diverse subjects which “order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as
they think fit”185 exist. These areas are kept untouched for sovereign
state in Hobbes’ century. Even today, sovereign states seek cooperation with each other in the form of temporary Strategic Partner or instituting a Dispute-Resolving Mechanism. As a result, the influence
of NGOs which pursue common good that transcends states’ interest,
is rejected in these areas.
Distinct from “site of justice,” fields like medicine, health care,
education, etc. can inspire NGO operations to form clear, defined,
and precise goals, contradictory to vague, diffuse, and relatively un179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

NOEL MALCOLM, ASPECT OF HOBBES 455 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
THOMAS HOBBES, BEHEMOTH 144 (The Univ. of Chicago Press 1990).
LEVIATHAN, supra note 41, Ch. 14.
R.K. GUPTA, supra note 177.
Michel Foucault first used this term to indicate the market in the middle ages and the
16th and 17th Century. The politics, of course, is a typical site of justice. MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, 30 (Palgrave Macmillan 2008).
184. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 125.
185. Id. at Chapter 2. 4.
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specified goals.186 These subjects are not identified with ones having
only a sole primary goal, because NGOs in these fields can have
many primary goals, but still operate abstractly with clearly defined
multi-goals. Areas like education, health, and science,187 which tend
to help NGOs operate on them to form clearly defined and precise
goals, are favored for NGOs to prosper.
Some areas like environment and social problems, though they
could not always escape from contradicting other areas’ goals of development, can still provide relatively precise goals for NGOs. Despise some resistance, NGOs also thrive in these areas. A wellorganized market is still “a site of justice.”188 Because it creates
competitive relations among various subjects, and rejects any unified
goal, in general sense, for its participants. However, when a unified
global market is still in development, establishing it is a great project,
which can provide clearly defined goal for NGOs. Establishing a
global market is one of the most significant goals after the Cold War,
it is not surprising that the number of INGOs that operate in areas of
major economic concern have generally grown more rapidly than the
number of those that are concerned with essentially noneconomic
matters.189
We can categorize some typical areas with clarity of the “Goals
of Subjects” presented in the figure below:
Level by Typical Areas
Degree
1
Science/Technology
2
Environment and Social Problem
3
Economy and Commerce

Goals of Subjects
Clearly defined, Precise
Relatively Precise
Unspecified

in

Economic

186. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, 30 (Palgrave Macmillan 2008).

187. According to a document in 1973, NGOs’ Goal Type is categorized as “Politics, religion, recreation, education, health, welfare, economics, mass media, science, etc.”
Among them, goals of education, health and science can be best compatible with other
develop goals. David Smith, Dimensions and Categories of Voluntary Organizations/NGOs, NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q., 116-120 (Apr. 1973).
188. FOUCAULT, supra note 186, 30.
189. JORDAN, supra note 176, at 509, 3733.
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Aspect
Military, Autonomy, Territory Vague, Diffuse, Unspecified
goals
As the level moves up, clarity of the “Goals of Subjects” goes
downward, and the degree of difficulty for NGOs’ survival increases.
If a subject like “Science/Technology”（except for some special areas getting involved with intense national interests like space technology and energy） can lay a foundation for NGOs to develop programs with clearly defined and precise goals, it is ideal for NGOs in
terms of survival. No NGO can excise a representative power for
various sovereign states in a site of justice, for these areas lack a
method of governing through programs with precise goals.
To sum up, the ideal subject for an NGO is one with clearly defined, precise goals and is isolated or compatible with other subjects
lest drawing governments’ hostility. Then the following question is:
if there is an ideal subject that has both characters, what kind of association can be expected for NGOs that operate on it?
The Character of Association Brought about by NGOs
A. From Cooperation to Association.
In the previous part, our analysis was confined within a single
NGO. Within a NGO, groups of people gather together hierarchically and are assigned respective works according to specific goals.190
The general relationship among the individuals in a NGO is cooperation. We must distinguish cooperation from association. Unlike cooperation within an organization, the association presumes plural
subjects in various kinds of relationships, such as competition.191 Of
course, individuals within a single NGO also have competitive relationships with each other. However, this competition is often influenced by the administrative structure and functional structure based
on the division of labor of the organization. While the competitions
among subjects in an association always happen among equal subjects, the association provides an open field for various organizations
190. Gunther Luschen, Cooperation, Association, and Contest, J. OF CONFLICT RESOL., 21
(Mar. 1970).
191. Id.
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to chase their own goals.192 The competitions among them are not
confined by the administrative structure and functional structure because of the division of labor of the organization. So the association
is closer to an equilibrium system rather than an administrative system. No matter how fierce the competition is among subjects, this
system at least has a shared formal rules which contributes to establish the game and some shared values. A healthy state is a typical civil association. Likewise, this paper categorizes NGO as a special cooperation among individuals, while the society idealized by NGOs is
considered a joint unit.
The process of thriving NGOs is the same process for reproducing their way of governing. When NGOs might acquire the dominant
role in the whole society, they are socialized and reshape the social
association by their reproductive works. Though the association presumes competition among subjects, it also constitutes a system of
basic rules for them. As Luschen Gunther claims, “even among parties at war, there is a certain amount of mutual understanding.”193 So
the mutual understanding is nothing abnormal in a social association.
The mutual understanding among NGOs helps to form the main character of the social association dominant and also idealized by NGOs.
What might it be?
At the beginning of the ninth chapter, Mr. Szazi quoted a section
from McDougal, Laswell, and Reisman’s paper: “posterity may characterize our period as the renascent of the individual.”194 What is the
meaning of “the renascent of the individual?” Does it mean that “the
sovereign nation-states...would come to an end and the whole international society is governed by mass?”195 Mr. Szazi rebukes this radical
point of view. It may destroy the pillars of international law and reject its own essence, “i.e., the respect to fundamental freedoms of expression and self-government” which may doom the individuals.196
On the contrary, he believes that the real renascent of the individual, from the perspective of pluralism, presumes an “international system supported in various long-established legal doctrines.”197 Under
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
SZAZI, supra note 15, at 271.
Id.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 276.
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this presumption, through non-governmental organizations, individuals could “interact with the United Nations,” which could compensate
for lack of inter-nationality in the system of states and nations.198 It
can be inferred from Mr. Szazi’s work that the proliferation of NGOs
could contribute to the real “renascent of the individual.” Is that the
truth in any case?
This, he claims, is the position of legitimate subjects for
NGOs.199 If NGOs come to be the legitimate subjects, they will enter
into field of politics as active actors. Therefore, his claim is not
about the general relationship between NGOs and individuals; rather,
he suggests endowing NGOs with direct political effect. Politics, in
its broadest sense, is the activity through which individuals make,
preserve, and amend the general rules by which they live.200 As active
actors in international politics, NGOs have possibilities to make their
desires and goals compulsory ones. Through these desires and goals,
NGOs could expand and reproduce their ways of cooperation and
shape international human society into a new kind of association.
B. Premises.
In order to analyze the possible political impact to individuals by
NGOs, we can suppose an extreme situation for NGOs, which means
to create an ideal international political environment for them. We
can suppose the NGOs acquire a predominant position in international politics that results in NGOs being able to create a civil society by
their nature, without any distortion from the impact of states and intergovernmental organizations. This assumption can be embodied
through confining the discussion into international politics rather than
domestic politics. It is more reasonable to set this constraint to our
discussion because it is much more difficult to imagine that a domestic NGO occupies the rudder of politics within a state. There is no
dominant subject in international politics like the sovereign state in
domestic politics. Based on this premise, NGOs might provide a new
chance for instituting international association that never existed.
The same premise can be further embodied by this statement：NGOs also have a dominant position over other subjects in in198. Id. at 276-77.
199. Id. at 272.
200. ANDREW HEYWOOD, POLITICS 2 (Palgrave Macmillan 4th ed. 2013).
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ternational politics like states and IGOs. In experience, the impacts
from states and other kinds of international organizations always oppress and distort the actions of NGOs. If we remove these impacts by
granting the dominant position to NGOs in international politics, the
association shaped by NGOs is clearly presented to us.
With this assumption, we can make a thought experiment to address the following question: if the international society is shaped and
dominated only by NGOs, what does it look like? According to the
earlier part of the paper, an abstract subject that can also nurture precise goals tends to idealize NGOs. Under the double ideal premises—the ideal subjects being the internal condition for NGOs and the
ideal environment of politics, which is the external condition—what
kind of global human society would be nurtured through the association impulse by NGOs? Can this new pattern of association in international politics really promote the emancipation of individuals or be
compatible with the profits of individuals?
C. Enterprise Association.
On idealistic subjects, NGOs easily concentrate on clearly defined and precise goals. The goals are supposed to be shared by
members of NGOs. Individuals who take part in the association in
forms of NGOs connect each other through a common purpose or interest. Mr. Oakeshott once defined this kind of cooperation on the
foundation of specific purposes as enterprise association.201 Such association is to give an intelligible account of their relationship “only
by specifying the object, the purpose, or the interest in terms of why
they are related.”202 Then we can also categorize areas like science
and technology or even environment and social problem as areas for
enterprises. Areas of enterprise are easy for NGOs to multiply. Accordingly, NGOs in these areas are always present as enterprise association of individuals.
According to specific purposes in a particular field, the NGO analyzes itself by constitute according to the natural or functional attributes of the regions. NGOs are confined by their goals, which lead
the sub-level goals making and aiming to effectively achieve the final
goals. It means that clearly defined and precise goals in particular ar201. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT 115 (Oxford Univ. Press 1975).
202. Id. at 116.
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eas not only contribute to an ideal condition for NGOs, but also bind
them. Natural or functional attributes of the regions, in the perspective of an NGO, may not coincide with political boundaries. In order
to fulfill the ideal allocation of the regional goals of governance,
NGOs tend to ignore all the political boundaries of the states, which
is not, of course, compatible with states’ interests.
In a specific area, NGOs are prone to unite or absorb a dominant
one by nature, other than keep the separate situation perpetual. Robert Nozick, a professor at Harvard University, suggested that, in the
state of nature, a dominant protective association gradually substitutes diverse protective associations.203 The NGOs are different from
protective associations which are viewed as “larva” of the states. The
discrepancy makes the uniting process much easier for diverse NGOs
to be absorbed by a dominant NGO in specific area. The most significant difference between them is that the NGOs do not seek to monopolize the coercive force by their nature. The issue of monopolizing the coercive force, of course, is always involved with fierce
disputes or even wars, which may make the chaos persist. On the
contrary, NGOs always associate individuals mainly through interests
inducing, by claiming to seek for common wealth in particular areas.
So the dominant NGO in the specific area is imaginable. Besides, to
solve problems or make efficient progress in a specific area, NGOs
need the knowledge and technology of expertise. The power structure of professional knowledge and technology are exclusive plural
subjects by nature. Therefore, the premise of plural NGOs will hinder
the idealization of integrating resources in applying professional
knowledge and technology. The NGOs are prone to unite by nature.
The idealized NGO is believed as the one that has the position of
monopoly in a specific area.
Then we can suggest that the international system is only constituted by three states: A, B and C; and also, three areas α,β and γ make
up the multi-aspects of common interests. In order to achieve maximum output to fulfill the special purpose in α, goals in regions of A,
B, and C should be distributed respectively as αA, αB, and αC, if and
only if sum of αA+αB+αC is maximum, and so on. On contrary, to
maximize country A’s benefit, goals in ares α, β, and γ should be distributed respectively as Aα, Aβ, and Aγ, if and only if sum of
203. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 16 (Basic Books 1974).
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Aα+Aβ+Aγ is maximum, and so on. Then we can list goals distribution in diverse areas and regions according to two different standpoints in the figure below:

Area
State
α
β
γ
R.D According

A

B

C

Aα
αA
Aβ
βA
Aγ
γA
Aα+Aβ+Aγ

Bα
αB
Bβ
βB
Bγ
γB
Bα+Bβ+Bγ

Cα αC
Cβ βC
Cγ γC
Cα+Cβ+Cγ

to State

R.D According
to Areas
αA+αB+αC
βA+βB+βC
γA+γB+γC
Common
Interests

It is plain that Aα is by no means identified with αA, and Aβ is
by no means identified with βA, and so on. To achieve a specific
goal, NGOs should adopt rational distribution according to maximum
output in geographic areas it operates, and will reject goals in particular regions preferred allocated by states. It is easy for us to conclude
that NGOs are guided by their fixed goals in specific areas and tend
to suppress states’ goals if they can predominate politics. Amongst
the two perspectives, individual are the core of the national perspective, while NGOs share a premise of a highly non-personalized perspective and cannot represent the individuals. For only the natural or
functional attributes of the regions will be taken into consideration,
and also the voice of individuals is silenced by professional
knowledge for achieving the particular goals efficiently. In international politics, only sovereign states, as persons204 behind interests
and goals, can represent individuals, if it legalized by a reasonable
political process.205 If the effects of states are overridden by that of
NGOs in international society, individuals will be led to doom. Besides, there are also separate perspectives to calculate common interests or common goals.
At the standpoint of NGOs, common interests consist of interests
in diverse areas. As a result, to maximize common interests, the
maximum of αA+αB+αC, βA+βB+βC, and γA+γB+γC should be ful204. LEVIATHAN, supra note 41, at Ch. 16.
205. Id.
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filled simultaneously. However, it is nearly impossible to achieve
this goal. For the goal in area α is considered by no means compatible with the goals in β and γ. As Oakeshott believed, “genuinely conflicting purposes or interests may make it difficult for an agent to
embrace certain combinations of enterprise association.”206 Therefore, the goals expected by NGOs are only “contingently connected
with the common purpose or interest concerned.”207 On the other
hand, the real joint purpose or interest can only be expected in the
system of states. Though facing immeasurable difficulties, joint purpose or interest can be achieved by an idealized discourse among
sovereign states. Finally, representative democracy can open a door
for individuals to take part in the international politics.
D. Closed International Society.
When the policies enforced by states, according to their sovereign in the specific area, are discordant with the governance of
NGOs, there is tension. Similarly, in a state, it is nothing but collision among classes and individuals caused by their diverse decisions
that leads to tension. Karl Popper has defined an open society as one
“in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions.”208 For
the states to claim their authority to make decisions in complex situation, we can say the international society constituted by sovereign
states is an open society.
As we have noted, abstract fields and subjects are the important
elements to contribute to an ideal environment for NGOs. This ideal
circumstance makes NGOs operating abstractly a great benefit of it.
Operating abstractly, as we have explained, means getting rid of obstacles by states’ actions. Geographical space, in perspective of INGOs, tends to exclude political space of territories.209 The utopia of
the international society dominated by the governance of INGO is the
very association without tension. Absence of social tension, as Popper argues, is the character of “a tribal closed society” which “may be
based on slavery does not create in itself a social tension, because
slaves sometimes form no more part of society than its cattle; their
206.
207.
208.
209.

OAKESHOTT, supra note 201, at 117.
Id. at 115.
KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 165 (Princeton Univ. Press 2013).
Id. at 606-7.
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aspirations and problems do not necessarily create anything that is
felt by the rulers as a problem within society.”210
Of course, there are seldom any similarities between individuals
or states in modern global society and slaves in ancient society.211
However, what we take into consideration is not experienced in modern global society. This analogy is on the premise of the ideal environment of NGO. Under this assumption, individuals as well as
states, though important in general, will not create any problems perceived by the INGOs. According to this analogy, a NGO predominated international world is a “closed society,” which has as its creed
that the individual is nothing.
There is still an unsolved problem hindering this analogy. According to Popper, a closed society is characterized by the belief in
magical taboos212 and submission to magical force213 which is a mystical unity,214 and hostile to reason,215 while an open society is marked
by rationalism216 and critical217 thought. An NGO is much closer to
the production of reason than magical force. How can we identify an
international society dominated by NGOs as a closed society? The
problem is created by confusing different categories of reason.
Which kind of reason is the mother of NGO? Is it the same one that
gives birth to the open society? If we clarify the meanings of term
“reason” in different settings, all the confusions could be wiped out.
In Plato’s work, reason acts as one of the three elements of spirit,
the other two being courage and want.218 Reason is “the ability to behave reasonably and with judgment”219 and dwells in the upper region
of the soul. It is a good guide for human behavior in any occasion
without limiting itself to logical aspects — the point of which also
inherited by Aristotle, for reason always functions in super-logical

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 614.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 513.
POPPER, supra note 208, at 613.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 613.
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, LECTURES IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 152 (Terry
Nardin & Luke O’Sullivan eds., 2011).
219. Id.

118

3 POTENTIAL IMPACTS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/21/16 6:37 PM

Potential Impacts on Individuals

Vol. IV, No. I

aspects of life.220 It is reason that endows humans with the ability of
communication by means of language. Somewhat close to Popper’s
argument, Aristotle identified reason to making reasonable arguments. Reason in eyes of is Greek philosophers is an emancipator rather than a disaster to individuals.
Reason has had multiple meanings for a long time, it has been
defined as “the capacity for consciously making sense of things, applying logic, establishing and verifying facts, and changing or justifying practices, institutions, and beliefs based on new or existing information.”221 However, it is narrowed gradually into the logical
aspect of the world. When scientism began to spread all over the Europe beginning in the Seventeenth Century with an arrogant belief
that the truth of everything is logic and experience observed; reason
came to be viewed as a productive system which produces truth
through theories by enforcing logic forms to observed experiences.222
In this period, though reason was confined into a solo aspect of logic,
it was also compatible to various values.
Since the Nineteenth Century, utility has increasingly encompassed all the traditional values.223 Reason began to act as a servant
of technology and helped in calculating profit and loss in interests.224
Reason and utility contributed to establish the “regime of verification” which, according to Foucault, “is not a law of truth, but a set of
rules enabling one to establish which statements in a given discourse
can be described as true or false.”225 In the public fields, a regime of
truth that only operated in science before and, according to Hobbes,226
by no means entered into fields of practice, connected up to governing practice for the first time. A regime of truth sanctified this kind
of reason and blocked its other aspects from its traditional meaning.
In the modern world, reason has a close connection with “a new
technology of the exercise of power.”227 Michel Foucault keeps a
220. Id.
221. Nikolas Kompridis, So We Need Something Else to Mean, 8 INT’L J. PHIL. STUD. 271
(2000).
222. See generally id.
223. FOUCAULT, supra note 186, at 44.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 35.
226. See generally LEVIATHAN, supra note 41, 158.
227. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 124 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon, Leo
Marshall, John Mepham, & Kate Soper trans. 1980).
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close eye on this innovation, which “begins to exercise itself through
social production and social service.”228 This new technology has redefined the problems in some fields such as “demography, public
health, hygiene, housing conditions, longevity and fertility,”229 which
are the very soil of NGOs’ thriving. Dealing with problems in these
new fields, “a real and effective ‘incorporation’ of power was necessary”230 for NGOs. Under the regime of truth, reason being in its new
form, is believed to be the best tool to achieve this aim for it can provide both truth and efficiency. On the one hand, the regime of truth
makes any rational criticism of the new kind of reason inconceivable.231 On the other hand, it also helps reason create some rules for
NGOs under the name of governing according to truth concerning
these two phenomena. Reason, throughout the cooperation inspired
by NGOs’ operations, is a perfect substitute for magic force and taboo in a closed society. According to Mr. Oakeshott, it is just this
new form of reason that is destructive to individuality.232
Popper claims reason, a character of an open society, is identified with arguments. Arguments suggest multi-subjects, thus making
reason individualized. The real open society exists only when individuals can use reason to plan as they see fit and express themselves
in the public world. This highly individualized reason is the same as
the one in Hobbes’ theory.233 In Hobbes’ theory human beings are
not considered to be irrational creations. Rather, their reason is highly individualized.234 Any form of acquired universal reason is not legitimate. This individualized reason led to chaos in international politics in the Seventeenth Century which is also believed to be the
golden age of autonomy according to Richard Tuck.235 Similarly, according to Popper’s point of view, conflict is the result of the individualized reason, and is widespread in the open society. On the contrary, reason in the context of NGOs is supported by the regime of
228. Id. at 125.
229. Id. These problematic fields also guide the formation of global governance in the contemporary era.
230. Id.
231. See generally MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, HOBBES ON CIVIL ASSOCIATION 66-67 (1975).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 67.
234. Id.
235. TUCK, supra note 27, at 11.
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truth, which sweeps out any conflicts and brings doom to the individuals. If international society is dominated by the governance of
NGOs, individuals can hardly cause conflicts and create tension from
inside, and are easily ignored in politics.
Then what does it matter to the NGO? If there is no big tension
from inside, its relation with objects acquires an incomparable importance. Then the answer could be some external menace. What is
external menace? The external menace acts as “fortune” to NGOs.
The term “fortune” is borrowed from the politic theory of classic republicanism. Fortune is defined in classic republicanism as the force
which directs contingent events, and thus “symbolizes pure, uncontrolled, and illegitimated contingency.”236 Fortune is always used to
describe the relationship between the sovereign and the objects of its
governing. In this perspective, individuals are not connected or governed directly by the sovereign who rules them. The sovereign only
deals with the phenomenon of politics, which is the positive or negative impact caused by individuals. As a result, a “thin phenomenal
theme of interest”237 of impact is imposed between sovereign as governor and their individuals. Thus, the voice of individuals is blocked
by this kind of “thin phenomenal theme.” Concerning the way to
govern a newly conquered republic, Machiavelli grimly suggested to
the new king of this land “the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.”238 In this case, the sovereign does not take new citizens
as individuals “in themselves” into consideration. He only cares
about the hazard of subverting the sovereign brought about by “hatred, and desire for vengeance.”239 The voice of individuals is silenced in this kind of governance.
Similarly, NGOs also govern through this kind of “thin phenomenal theme of interests.” This goal of governance is far from satisfying the real and diverse needs of individuals. The method of it is to
make projects to achieve specific goals. Individuals are treated as an
undifferentiated unity, and only positive or negative interests of this
unity will be considered in the process of governance. This kind of
governance can also cover particular areas such as democracy and
236. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 156 (2d ed. 2003).
237. FOUCAULT, supra note 186, at 46.
238. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 2 (Peter Bondanella & Mark Musa trans., 1984).
239. Id.
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human rights. For example, some pro-democratization NGOs are
immersed in the task of strengthening the taproots of democracy, and
are making positive impacts on the democratization processes occurring in South Africa, Tajikistan and Argentina.240 Despite whatever
accomplishments these NGOs have achieved, democracy is still regarded as an unfinished social project of commonwealth. In the case
of pro-democratization NGOs, individuals are still not considered directly in their governance.
What is most important is not the special areas or subjects NGOs
deal with, but rather the way of their governance. If democracy is
considered as a magnificent project rather than a kind of association
of various citizens, and if human rights are treated as a commonwealth of human race as a whole rather than the precious value of
every man, individuals will be submerged in this splendid prospect as
well. In other words, there is no demos underlying NGO’s governance. J. H. H. Weiler, a professor and the European Union Jean
Monnet Chair at the New York University School of Law, has suggested, “there is no convincing account of democracy without demos.”241 Even under our ideal premise, pro-democratization NGOs
can never achieve their goals for the mission if it is not compatible
with the governance because of their nature.242
E. Additional Remarks.
Some critics may say our analysis is based on the idealized
premise. Hence in experience, NGOs cease to reproduce this kind of
association into other areas that cannot provide ideal subjects for
them. Considering that the ideal subjects exist only in a few select
areas among various areas of our full experience, NGOs are far from
a threat to politics. This criticism confuses our method and our goal.
Please remember that the aim of studying the premise of idealistic
subjects is to reveal the association brought about by NGOs without
any distortion. The idealized subjects premise is concerned with the

240. JULIE FISHER, IMPORTING DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF NGOS IN SOUTH AFRICA,
TAJIKISTAN AND ARGENTINA 3 (2013).
241. Joseph H. H. Weiler, Governance Without Government: The Normative Challenge to
the Global Legal Order, in THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBALIZATION 49, 74 (Edmond Malinvaud & Louis Sabourin eds., 2004).
242. Id.
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methodologies. If we achieve our research goal, the premise could be
removed. When the premise is removed, the characters of society are
reduced to a future possibility, and the potential impact to politics
brought about by NGOs.
How could it be? What really threaten politics are not NGOs as
subjects in the international world. The true threat is the particular
technology of governance carried by NGOs. In other words, NGOs
are mere mediums of this technology of governance. The increasing
impact of NGOs in some areas of international politics can open the
door for the invasion of this technology of governance into all areas.
What lies at the foundation of this technology is an external perspective, which is prone to view every issue as a program, and leads to the
doom of individuals.243 This pattern of governance tends to reproduce the external perspective into every area through particular subjects such as NGOs.
Michel Foucault once discovered this kind of technology originated in the theories and practice of governance of states in Eighteenth Century Europe.244 He found that the term “population” which
is “absolutely foreign to the juridical and political thought of earlier
centuries” gradually converted the old notion “people” into politics,245 the “multiplicity of individuals” on which the term “population” has no claim, dwell in the notion of “people.” The notion of
“population” as “a new collective subject” premises an external perspective in which the people as themselves never exist. Only the
numerical aspect of people is considered in population through its
contribution to interest.246 In the new kind of governance, the final
objective is the population. As Foucault suggested, “the population is
pertinent as the objective, and individuals, the series of individuals,
are no longer pertinent as the objective, but simply as the instrument,
relay, or condition for obtaining something at the level of the population.”247 When art of government replaced sovereignty, which meant

243. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION 65 (Michael Senellart ed.,
Graham Burchell trans., 2009).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 54.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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the changing perspective, population substituted people and emerged
a new object in the practice of politics.248
In fact, the method applied to deal with issues depends on the
technology of governance. The different notions are the carriers of
diverse perspectives. Basically, the particular perspective is constructive to the technology of governance. Therefore, the answer of
“how to deal with it” does not depend on the question “what to deal
with,” rather it relies on “how to view it.” In other words, the pillar
and the foundation of governance is not the objects or issues being
dealt with, but the perspective which helps to construct them; therefore, what really matters is not the particular area or subject, but the
specific perspective premised by the governance. Even in the same
area, diverse perspectives lead to construct their subjects in totally
different ways.
For example, the reason that the issues of international politics
before the Twentieth Century concentrated on war and peace does not
mean the aspects of other issues preferred by the modern international world could not be entered into the discussion. In fact, international trade and other issues always lie at the center of international politics, but in the perspective of sovereign state dominated by the notion
of autonomy, every significant issue was viewed as the representation
of conflict and cooperation among sovereign states. Likewise, when
the perspective is changed, the subject of war and peace may also be
workable for NGOs. When wars break out amongst diverse states,
the subject of security absorbs concerns for justice and states’ interests they are viewed as a new kind of program—anti-terrorism. The
most significant difference between war and anti-terrorism is diverse
perspectives. In the battle among the states, each side claims to act
justly to legislate its actions. While in the state of anti-terrorism, the
enemy is viewed as terrorism, a problem that needs to be resolved, or
as a threat poised to remove states’ security. The voices of the enemies are silenced by this demo-voice-damping technology supported
by the external perspective. Though lacking military power, NGOs
are seldom able to work on this area. However, the battle-field reconstructed by this external perspective already has the possibility to
open the door for NGOs.

248. Id.
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Above all, just like every important issue where views are representatives of war and peace in the Seventeenth Century, every solution to major problems in the contemporary international field can be
reconstructed by the external perspective into a project for governance of NGOs. The demo-voice-damping function of this new technology of governance can reform every area from discussions of multi-subjects to programs.
Conclusion: The Correct Position of NGOs in International
Politics.
In order to clarify our discussion, we limit the term “politics” to
the narrow sense: the practicing of coercive power.249 Creating policy and legislation are two major ways to practice coercive power.
Under the principle of democracy, this kind of coercive power is assigned to an active legal status. This positive legal status not only requires the subjects themselves to belong to the law, but also requires
them to be legislators or policy makers. However, in most cases,
NGOs cannot properly function in policy making. They are always
granted consultative status in international policy making. Legal personality always means a more reliable identification for active participants in politics. Peter Willetts, Emeritus Professor of Global Politics at City University of London, has demonstrated special cases
which can bear witness to the legal personality of NGOs.250 He discovered that some NGOs take part into international politics in one of
the following forms: being equal to states in international diplomacy;
being among the Observers at the UN General Assembly; having a
special role in procedures for handling human rights and the environment; or by participating in intergovernmental committees.251 Besides, “there are currently more than 1,500 NGOs which work in collaboration with states on a basis of equality of statutes and equal
participation right, including the ultimate right of voting on authoritative decisions.”252 He claims that, “states, transnational NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, international non-governmental organi-

249. Adrian Leftwich, Politics: People, Resources and Power, in WHAT IS POLITICS: THE
ACTIVITY AND ITS STUDY 62, 62 (Adam Leftwich ed., 2004).
250. WILLETTS, supra note 170, at 83.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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zations, and hybrid international organizations are...participants in the
international legal system.”253 Through several advocates state,
NGOs can be expected to have broader rights for legislation and
more stable statues of legal personality.
Can NGOs be seen as competent actors in politics by participating in legislation and equipping with coercive power? Of course not.
In the core meaning of politics, coercive power cannot be separated
from its law side, which means the norms of political power should
be studied as well in specific areas. In traditional theory, politics is a
site of justice. Everything that is attached to politics is a site of justice as well. For example, the market in the Middle Ages and the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries was a site of justice.254 Then what
is a site of justice? Without doubts, state of nature is a typical site of
justice. In state of nature, as John Locke depicted, “the execution of
the law of nature is...put into every man’s hand.”255 Actors in a site
of justice are equipped in their claims of justice. The next question
is, what is justice?
A basic element constituting the presupposition of justice is
harmony.256 When analyzing the justice in the state, Cicero said,
through the person of Scipio that:
Just as with string instruments or pipes or in singers’ voices
a certain harmony of different sounds must be maintained,
and as that harmony, though arising from the management
of very different notes, produces a pleasing and agreeable
sound, so a state, by adjusting the proportions between the
highest, lowest, and intermediate classes, as if they were
musical notes, achieves...and such concord cannot exist at
all without justice.257
Actually, the special “subject—state” is not important in the explanation. Cicero’s purpose was to reveal the relationship of justice
and harmony by making an analogy between music and justice. Ac253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
FOUCAULT, supra note 186.
LOCKE, supra note 184, at 2.7.
MARCUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA DE LEGIBUS: THE REPUBLIC 69 (Clinton Walker
Keyes, ed. Harvard University Press 1943).
257. Id.
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cording to Dooyeweerd, justice indicates “a harmonizing process
preventing from any excess.”258 It means that, the subjects in the
field of politics should either act as agencies “weighing all the interests against each other in a retributive sense,”259 to enforce this harmonizing process as the state sovereign does in domestic politics, or
create an open stage of justice as states do in international politics.
NGOs can chose neither of the two ways. An NGO, by its nature, is a goal-achieving mechanism or good-product system, not
compatible with the nucleus of politics. Furthermore, concerning
“public justice involves harmonizing the various interests,”260 if there
are no diverse interests, there is no harmony. Meaning that harmony
is a particular relationship among individuals or other subjects
through the medium of interests, or we can say plural subjects are the
logical presupposition of justice. The model of governance of NGO
can only distinguish different parts which are absorbed into an overall
goal according to their natural features and functional assignment.
Then the governance of NGOs cannot contribute a harmonizing process. By contrast, it is the NGO that represents particular interests or
common good, which need to be further harmonized by politics. In
other words, the association operated by NGOs only have potential
properties in jural aspects until it is actualized by real subjects in politics. Roy Clouser defined the jural function concerning this kind of
subjects as a “Passive Function.”261 This function means that the subjects can only function objectively in a process of politics. Then we
can conclude that NGOs can only function passively in politics.
If the NGOs fail to fulfill the law or norm aspect of politics, it is
unreasonable for them to acquire coercive force, which is supported
by monopolizing violence in politics. In traditional political theory,
the state governs by monopolizing violence.262 Even in modern international politics, states have to pay the price when they have bro258. H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 2. The General Theory
of the Modal Spheres, 406 (2013),
http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/dooy002newc06_01/dooy002newc06_01.pdf.
259. Id. at 446.
260. Jonathon Chaplin, Public Justice’ as a Critical Political Norm, 72 PHILOSOPHIA
REFORMATA 130 (2007).
261. Roy Clouser, A Brief Sketch of the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, CHRISTIAN
MIND, http://www.christianmind.org/npc/wrestlers/files/dooyeweerd.pdf.
262. LOCKE, supra note 184, at 7.88.
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ken treaties among nations or other kinds of international law through
the imposition of sanctions, a form of the application of coercive
force. To the contrary, Thomas Risse claims that the modern practice
of politics has proved that monopolization of violence is not the only
way to govern.263 Interests can substitute violence in governance. He
says “[p]ositive incentives as well as sanctions are meant to affect the
cost-benefit calculations of the relevant parties and to induce the desired behavior.”264 This new kind of governance “aims at challenging
fixed interests and preferences so that actors are induced in a socialization process to internalize new rules and norms.”265 Actors like
firms and especially NGOs always adopt this way of governance.
Nevertheless, Risse’s assertion can only be applied in situations lacking a coercive force that does not conform to our narrow definition of
politics, and not the case in international society.266 Where coercive
force already exists, the rules and norms induced by NGOs through
challenging fixed interests and preferences can only be considered a
part of politics when they are authorized or at least acquiesced by
it.267 Risse has correctly indicated that until now, NGOs govern
mainly through the choices of individuals, rather than coercive
force.268 The ideal civil society is the heaven of choices. NGOs are
ingenious inventions for fulfilling the choices of individuals and
promoting the vitality of civil society. Therefore, there is no condemnation for them to thrive in civil society.
Is it right for NGOs to be equipped with coercive force? The answer is definitely no. For granting them legislative power is totally
another thing. The will of a NGO, as an enterprise association, “is
necessarily constituted by the continuous choice of each associate to
be related to others in terms of a common purpose, a choice from
which he/she must be able to extricate themselves.” As Mr.
Oakeshott has suggested, “compulsory enterprise association is a
self-contradiction.”269 If NGOs step over their boundaries and ac-

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

RISSE, supra note 19, at 11.
Id. at 11
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
OAKESHOTT, supra note 201, at 119.

128

3 POTENTIAL IMPACTS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/21/16 6:37 PM

Potential Impacts on Individuals

Vol. IV, No. I

quire coercive force, they contradict themselves and undermine international politics.
Szazi’s study introduced the NGOs’ influence on international
politics and law in its current state: NGOs not only have acquired legal personality “in several formal sources of law, notably treaties and
customary international law,”270 but also, act as “shapers of policy and
indispensable bridges between the general public and the intergovernmental processes” other than merely as “disseminators of information.”271
However, his study cannot deny the fact that, no matter what influences NGOs have brought, they still act passively in world politics
and without sharing coercive force. If NGOs keep within their
boundaries, they could, as Szazi argues, “constitute a remarkable contribution to pluralism at the international level and, even more importantly, a fundamental gust of fresh air in the bureaucracy.”272 But
if they seek for status of legitimate subjects, and ask for taking part in
the process of making decisions with coercive force in international
politics, by the chance of current inadequacy of formal political structure for international problem-solving and decision-making,273 they
have transgressed their boundaries.

270. SZAZI, supra note 15, at 278.
271. U.N. Secretary-General, Arrangements and practices for the interaction of nongovernmental organizations in all activities of the United Nations system, ¶¶ 57-59,
U.N. Doc. A/63/170 (10 July 1998).
272. SZAZI, supra note 15, at 278.
273. THOMAS G. WEISS, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: WHY WHAT WHITHER 3 (2013).
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